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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CELEBRITY CLUB, INC., a Utah
nonprofit corporation,
Petitioner,

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

v.
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION,

Case No. 16083

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner seeks relief from a decision of the Utah
Liquor Control Commission denying Petitioner's application for
a license to establish a state liquor store on the premises
of Petitioner.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION
Petitioner seeks an Order from this Court directing
Respondent to issue to Petitioner a license to establish a
state liquor store on its premises.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner is a nonprofit social club which applied
to Respondent for the issuance of a license for the establishment of a state liquor store on the premises of Petitioner
at 1037 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Prior to Res-

pondent's decision on Petitioner's application and prior to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the construction of necessary improvements required by statute and by rules and regulations of Respondent

(e.g., see

§16-6-13(6), Utah Code Annotated requiring extensive kitchen and dining facilities), Petitioner contacted Compliance
Agents of Respondent regarding the question of whether or
not the 600 foot proscription in §16-6-13.5 and §32-1-36.15,
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1977) is applicable.

Inquiry was

made because of the location of a private school.

The en-

trance to the school is at 3370 South 900 East, well beyond
the proscription, but the school property extends into the
interior portions of the block, thus prompting the inquiry.
Agents of the Respondent made physical inspections
of the area and advised Petitioner verbally that the proposed
location of the state liquor store would have to be changed
to exceed 600 feet.

Petitioner changed the proposed

locati~

pursuant to the direction of the Compliance Agents.
Physical inspection again was made and Petitioners
were advised verbally that the new location of the proposed
state liquor store was not within 600 feet of the school and
that a license could issue upon Petitioner satisfying numerous other conditions.

Measurement was made from the near-

est corner of the playground adjacent to the school building
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to the location of the proposed state liquor store.

The dis-

tance is 622 feet.
The points from which the measurement was made
were in accordance with an opinion of the Utah Attorney General.

See Exhibit 2 attached to the Stipulation of Facts

submitted in this matter.
By letter dated the 16th day of September, 1977,
Petitioner again was advised by an agent of Respondent whose
job it was to determine if applicable requirements are satisfied that Petitioner's facility "satisfies the 600 foot requirement."

See Exhibit l.

Subsequent to the repeated verbal and written representations of Respondent, and in reliance thereon, Petitioner
completed the club facility at a cost of nearly $200,000.00.
Petitioner completed its formal application to
Respondent and filed it with Respondent on the 21st day of
February, 1978.
On the 28th day of March, 1978, the Utah Attorney
General published a new opinion changing

the point of refer-

ence from which the measurement is to be made.
Rather than measuring

Exhibit 4.

from the location of the proposed state

liquor store as directed in the prior opinion, it was determined that the measurement is to be made from the nearest
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outside wall of the building in which the club is located.
Measuring in this manner, the club is not beyond 600 feet.
On the 15th day of September, 1978, Respondent
denied Petitioner's application solely on the basis that
the 600 foot requirement was not satisfied.

Petitioner's

application fully satisfied all other statutory requirements
and all rules and regulations of the Utah Liquor Control
Commission, and there were and now are licenses available.
A survey made in connection with some additional
property owned by the school, but not used as a playground
and not having a "school building" on it, was submitted.
Exhibit 5.

The property has a storage shed on it.

The Club

facility is not beyond 600 feet of the nearest point of said
additional property.
ARGUMENT 1
IN MEASURING 600 FEET, THE POINT AT THE
SCHOOL FROM WHICH THE MEASUREMENT SHOULD
BE MADE IS THE NEAREST BOUNDARY OF THE
PLAYGROUND TO THE CLUB FACILITY.
The Attorney General has issued two opinions relat·
ing to the applicable points of reference from which a
ment is to be made.

~easm~

With respect to the point of reference

at the school, both opinions of the Attorney General are

co~

sistent in that they recognize the nearest boundary of the
playground adjacent to the school as one of the two points
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of reference.
The first opinion sought to interpret Utah Code
Annotated §32-1-36.15 (Supp. 1977) which provides:
"No state store or package agency
shall be established within a radius of
600 feet of any public or private
school, church, library, public playground or park.
"
After discussing whether the term "school" relates only to the school building proper or to the school
building and surrounding playgrounds, the opinion concluded:
. . [T)he point of measurement to be
used in the case of a school is the
nearest wall of the school building if
there is no playground, or the nearest
point of the building or the boundary
of the school playground where a school
playground exists."
The second opinion quoted with approval the language of the first.

While it may be argued that both opin-

ions erroneously include playgrounds and that measurement
should be made from the nearest point of the school building
proper, it has been the consistent opinion of the Attorney
General and Respondent and its Compliance Agents that the
measurement should be made from the nearest boundary of the
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playground.
Petitioner acquiesced in such an interpretation
and submitted to Respondent a survey which measured from the
nearest boundary of the playground.
With all parties having applied the same point of
reference, and the use of such a point of reference being
based upon reason, it is submitted that the proper point of
reference at the school is the nearest boundary of the playground.
ARGUMENT II
THE APPLICABLE POINT OF REFERENCE
WITH RESPECT TO THE CLUB FACILITY
IS THE LOCATION OF THE PROPOSED
STATE LIQUOR STORE RATHER THAN THE
NEAREST WALL OF THE BUILDING IN
WHICH THE CLUB FACILITY IS LOCATED
Unfortunately, while the applicable statutes

clear~

set forth a 600 foot limitation, they offer little guidance as
to the points from which the measurement is to be made.

That

there is considerable difference of opinion regarding the man·
ner in which a designated number of feet is to be measured
is demonstrated in numerous cases dealing with the problem.
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In attempting to delineate the manner in which the
distance between two establishments is to be measured, the
controlling statutes and the Courts which have construed those
statutes have been less than consistent.
Measurement along the shortest route of ordinary
traffic has been one approach.

In State Beverage Department

v. Brentwood Assembly of God Church, 149 So. 2d 871 (1963) the
applicable statute specified such a measurement but the Court
still was forced to define "the shortest route of ordinary
pedestrian travel."
407 S.W. 2d 148 (Ky.

See also Hunt Club, Inc. v. Moberly,
) where the licensed premises

were deemed not to be within the 200 foot proscription though
the rear portions of the two buildings were within 200 feet.
A measurement in a straight line also has been considered the appropriate means of determining distance E.g. see
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. State
Board of Equalization, 37 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1934).
Once it has been determined that the measurement is
to be along a route of pedestrian traffic, or in a straight
line, or according to some other formula, the interpretation of
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a statute is not complete for it must be further expanded to
include the points at which the measurement is to begin
Again, inconsistency reigns.

d
an e:.

The Courts have adop:,

measurements from front door to front door, curb to curb, bul:.
ing to building, property line to property line and various
combinations of these terminal points.

See 4 A.L.R. 3d l2SQ

and the cases cited therein for a treatment of the subject,
Against the backdrop of the lack of consistency in
judicial interpretation and because of the failure of the Utar.
Legislature to definitively state the manner in which a measur,.
ment is to be made, the Utah Liquor Control Commission asked
th8 Utah Attorney General for guidance.
By written opinion dated the 15th day of November,
1976

(see Exhibit 2 to the Stipulation of Facts), the Utah

Attorney General determined that the proper measurement is a
straight line

betwee:-~

the nearest point on the boundary of the

playground, if a playground exists, to the proposed site

I

of~

state liquor store.
The opinion is founded on reason and Petitioner sub· '
mits it should be adopted by this Court.
At the conclusion of the opinion it is stated:
"Legal basis for contrary interpretations does exist. For this reason
if this opinion is not in keeping_with
the legislature's intent in enact~ng
.
the above cited section ample opportun~ty
will exist to clarify said intent in t~e
.
upcoming legislative session." [Emphas~s addec
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The 1977 ligislative session did nothing to alter
the interpretation of the Attorney General.

Therefore, it is

believed by Petitioner that the opinion reflects the intent of
the legislature.
Both the Petitioner and the Utah Liquor Control Commission conducted themselves in accordance with the first opinion for a period well in excess of one year and during the
entire period Petitioner was constructing the club facility.
The second opinion of the Attorney General was published more than a year and four months after the first opinion;
it was no better reasoned than the first opinion; the Utah
Legislature expressed nothing to indicate a change in its intent as expressed in the first opinion; and Petitioner expended
nearly $200,000.00 in reliance on the first opinion.

The sec-

ond opinion of the Attorney General should be rejected as a
standard for measurement.
ARGUMENT III
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO
DENY A LICENSE TO PETITIONER ON THE
BASIS OF THE 600 FOOT PROSCRIPTION.
As has been set forth above, Petitioner contends that
a proper interpretation of Utah Code Annotated §16-6-13.5 and
32-l-36.15 (Supp. 1977) results in Petitioner being beyond the

-9-
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required 600 feet.

If this Court were to adopt an interpre-

tation which resulted in a measurement of less than

600 feet,

I

it is the assertion of Petitioner that fundamental fairness

j

dictates that Respondent be estopped to deny a license on t~
basis of the 600 foot limitation.

i

Petitioner recognizes that estoppel is to be appliec!I
to governmental entities with great care in that

unrestrain~

exercise of the principle may hobble the entity's sovereign
power.

However, it is clear that the doctrine is applicable

to governmental bodies when the underlying facts justify its
application and where it is necessary to apply the doctrine tc
prevent an injustice.

For authorities recognizing that estopp,

can be invoked against governmental agencies see Surety Saving'!

& Loan Association v. State Department of Transportation,
ision of Highways, 195 N.W.2d 464

m~

(Wis. 1972); Palm Gardens, I:

v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 514 P. 2d 888

(Or. 1973);

Mountain States Advertising, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 552 P.:j
(N.M. 1976); Martinez v. Florida Department of Commerce, 358S:
2d 115 (Fla. 1978); Finch v. Mathews, 443 P.2d 833 (Wash. l96i
People ex. rel. Mac Mullen v. Harrington, 188 N.W. 2d 214
(Mich. 1971); Hickey v. Illinois Central R. Co., 220 N.E. 2dC
(Ill. 1966).
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The cases recognizing that governmental agencies are
subject to the doctrine of estoppel are legion, although some
cases refused to apply the principle because the relevant facts
did not support its application. E.g. see Walker Center Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 20 U.2d 346, 437 P.2d 888
(1968) where this Court refused to invoke estoppel because
"the record does not indicate that the Commission misled the
Plaintiff in any manner . . . "

Cf. Palm Gardens, Inc. v.

Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 514 P.2d 888 (Or. 1973) where
reliance was not justified because the party had knowledge to
the contrary of the fact or representation allegedly relied
upon; Hickey v. Illinois Control R. Co., 220 N.E.2d 415
(Ill. 1966) where there was mere inaction by the state and not
positive acts by officials which may have induced action.
This Court has spoken recently concerning the facts
which would support estoppel against a governmental entity.
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976).
In refusing to estop the Board because the Plaintiff had actual
knowledge of certain relevant facts and because the Board had
done nothing to delude or dissuade Plaintiff from properly
following required procedure, this Court approved the following
standard:
"Estoppel arises when a party (Defendant
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Board) by his acts, representations,
or admissions, or by his silence when
he ought to speak, intentionally or
through culpable negligence, induces
another (Plaintiffs) acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and
acts thereon so that he will suffer an
injustice if the former (Land Board) is
permitted to deny the existence of such
facts."
Having circumscribed the factual requisites necessar.l
for an application of estoppel, it is clear that the instant
case is one which meets the most stringent of tests.

If the

facts of this case do not demand that the Respondent be estopped, Petitioner submits that the doctrine of estoppel

may~

.~

longer be considered a viable legal principle in this juris-

I

diction.
Did Petitioner act reasonably and prudently?

This

is not a situation where the allegedly aggrieved party ( the

1

Petitioner) proceeded with its course of conduct and then asse•·
ted estoppel because of inaction on the part of the government.
Rather, prior to expending $200,000.00, Petitioner approached
Respondent for guidance.

Respondent was the only entity Pet-

itioner reasonably could go to for assistance.

In fact,

Respondent has the exlusive statutory authority to deal with

1

the problem.
Respondent did not fail to act upon being
with the question.

present~

Respondent proceeded to give specific d1r·
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1

ections with respect to the course of conduct Petitioner was
to take.

The directions did not come from clerks or others

upon whose advice one could not reasonably rely.

The dir-

ections came from personnel whose specific duties included
making determinations of compliance with statutory requirements and with rules and regulations of Respondent.

The re-

peated verbal ar:d written assurances of compliance from Respondent were further supported by an opinion of the Attorney General.
Without

do~bt,

Respondent engaged in affirmative conduct which

induced Petitioner to act and which Respondent full well knew
would induce Petitioner to act.

And surely Petitioner reason-

ably relied on the representations of the Respondent.
Once Respondent made a determination that Petitioner
could proceed as directed by Respondent without being in violation of the 600 foot requirement, Respondent quietly observed
Petitioner expend large sums on the facility in question.
Then, after the facility was completed, and for no apparent reason, the interpretation of the 600 foot requirement was changed.
The change came without any demonstrated change in legislative
policy, and in spite of the first opinion of the Attorney General which had alerted Respondent to the fact that the 1977
Legislature could be approached to make appropriate changes if
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the interpretation of the Attorney General was deemed to be
incorrect.
It is submitted that an injustice was perpetrated
and that the application of estoppel to Respondent is the ~~
essary remedy - if the Court sanctions Respondent's second
interpretation of the 600 foot limitation.

To not estop Re~

I!

pondent from enforcing its second interpretation against Petitioner will promote a substantial injustice and will be tantamount to a judicial approval of abuse of administrative
power.
Petitioner is not unmindful of the fact that the
Utah Liquor Control Commission has been given broad powers to
regulate alcoholic beverages in the State of Utah.
Annotated §32-l-6 (Supp. 1977).

Utah

Co~

But in the exercise of thoH:

powers, Respondent must act reasonably and fairly and not
arbitrarily as it did here.

Once Respondent has exercised ib

powers by promulgating regulations and establishing rules
of procedure, Respondent may not ignore those rules and regulations with impunity, particularly when to do so will
inflict serious injury on citizens of this State.
The course of conduct pursued by the Utah Liquor

Co~·

trol Commission is not in keeping with fundamental notions of
fair play and has denied to Petitioner due process of law
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u~

der Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The applicable survey to be considered is the one
under which both Petitioner and Respondent have operated from
the beginning, i.e., the survey which uses as one measuring
point the closest boundary of the playground.
The terminal points of the measurement should be

(1) the closest boundary of the playground and (2) the location
of the proposed state liquor store.

Such a measurement results

in Petitioner being in compliance with the 600 foot requirement.
If it is decided that the change in interpretation
applies the proper standard of measurement, Respondent should
be estopped to deny a license on the basis of the 600 foot
requirement, for Respondent acted in a manner which factually
supports estoppel and in a manner which did not meet standards
of essential fairness, thus denying to Petitioner due process
of law.
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